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Essay
COMPENSATING PORNOGRAPHY'S VICTIMS:
A FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
DANIEL A. COHEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The social regulation of pornography, or material containing graphic
depiction of sexual anatomy and sexual acts, has taken a new turn. Historically,
American society has sought to suppress pornography through public
enforcement of criminal obscenity statutes. A new breed of legislation, in
contrast, relies on private tort litigation against the pornography industry as a
means of social control. This new legislation reflects, in part, a new
understanding of the harms of pornography. Traditional obscenity legislation
was concerned with pornography's offensive nature and its tendency to corrupt
public morals. In contrast, the new legislation addresses pornography's alleged
role in promoting sexual violence.
In particular, both the federal government and state governments recently
have sought to impose tort liability upon producers, distributors, and sellers of
pornographic material that substantially contributes to the commission of a
criminal sexual offense. For example, an Illinois statute grants victims of
criminal sexual offenses a civil remedy against manufacturers, producers, and
wholesale distributors of obscene material, when that material proximately
causes the offender's criminal act.' The United States Senate has considered
a similar bill, the Pornography Victims Compensation Act, or PVCA for short.I
Such legislation creates a private cause of action when criminal sexual
offenders: (1) commit "copycat" crimes, in which they re-enact upon their
. Clerk to Judge J. Edward Lunbard, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. J.D.,
University of Michigan, 1994; M.A., University of Michigan, 1991; B. Phil, Oxford University,
1989; B.A., Princeton University, 1986.
1. 720 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/12-18.1 (West 1993).
2. S. REP. No. 1521, 102d Cong., lat Sess. (1991). The bill, however, never progressed
beyond a favorable committee vote. The committee report appears in S. REP. No. 372, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1992) [hereinafter REPoRT].
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victims violent pornographic scenes to which they have been exposed;3 (2) use
pornographic material as part of deliberate, pre-offense preparation;4 or (3) use
pornographic material in the course of the offense, viewing or forcing their
victims to view this material.5 The proposed cause of action offers some
distinct advantages over the current means of regulating pornography. First and
foremost, it creates a compensatory scheme for plaintiffs who can establish that
some particular pornographic product substantially contributed to their injuries.
Second, such tort liability can have a significant deterrent effect, by encouraging
producers, sellers, and distributors of pornography to minimize the likelihood
that their products will substantially contribute to such injuries. Third, given the
scarcity of public law enforcement resources, private litigation offers a much
cheaper way to regulate pornography.
As yet, no court has issued a direct ruling on the constitutional validity of
pornographers' tort liability for injuries caused by their consumers. However,
state and federal courts have ruled on an analogous set of cases. These are
cases in which plaintiffs allege that their injuries were caused by their attackers'
exposure to film or television violence.6 In those cases, courts generally have
raised the First Amendment as a bar to civil suit, citing concerns about the
potential for chilling media exploration of serious social issues.
This Essay draws on First Amendment jurisprudence in order to analyze the
constitutional status of tort liability for pornography-caused harms. The Essay
argues that under current obscenity law, pornography does not enjoy the same
constitutional immunity from tort liability for injuries to third parties enjoyed by
media violence in general. Current obscenity law itself, however, both
undervalues obscene speech and unduly tolerates state censorship. In addition,
the provision of tort remedies for porography-caused harms can have a
substantial chilling effect on valuable speech, well in excess of that posed by
current, criminal regulation of obscenity. Consequently, this Essay suggests
severely limiting the class of materials to which tort liability may attach.
The argument proceeds as follows. Part II explores the First Amendment
defense to tort liability for media violence in general. Part I explains why the
3. See REPORT, supra note 2, at 9; see also ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN
POSSESSING WOMEN 1-25 (1981).
4. See REPORT, supra note 2, at 7-9.
5. See id.
6. See Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981), cert.
denied, 458 U.S. 1108 (1982) (involving juveniles' re-enactment of a rape scene on a nine-year-old
girl); see also Bill v. Superior Court, 187 Cal. Rptr. 625 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (involving a girl who
was shot after leaving a theater that showed "gang movies"); Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (involving a teenager who killed a neighbor while
"intoxicated" by television violence).
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law of obscenity denies such a defense to the pornography industry in particular.
Part I1, however, also criticizes the Court's obscenity jurisprudence in light of
broader First Amendment concerns. Part IV examines the prospective chilling
effect of a tort remedy for pornography-caused harms and proposes a way of
narrowing the class of materials regulated so as to minimize this effect.
II. PROTECTED SPEECH AND TORT LIABILrrY
Legislation such as the PVCA imposes tort liability upon publishers,
filmmakers, and broadcasters for the sexual violence inflicted by consumers of
pornography. As a general rule, however, media depictions of violence have
enjoyed, under the First Amendment, freedom from tort liability for bodily
injuries inflicted by their consumers.7 Therefore, the question that arises is
what distinguishes pornography from these other cases.
As a preliminary step toward answering this question, this Part briefly
analyzes one such media violence case: Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting
Co." In Olivia, juveniles re-enacted a fictional, televised rape scene on a young
girl; however, the court dismissed the suit against the broadcaster. Analysis of
this case reveals that the televised scene enjoyed First Amendment protection
precisely because it appeared within a non-obscene program.
In Olivia, the NBC television network broadcasted a film which concerned
the harmful effects of a state-run home upon an adolescent girl. The film
included a violent rape scene, occurring in a shower, that showed four older
girls wrestling the adolescent to the ground and forcing her legs apart, while one
of them made intense thrusting motions with the handle of a toilet plunger. A
group ofjuveniles who had "viewed and discussed" this scene subsequently used
a bottle to commit an "artificial rape" of the plaintiff, a nine-year-old girl. The
plaintiff sued NBC, alleging in part that NBC "had knowledge of studies on
child violence and should have known that susceptible persons might imitate the
crime enacted in the film."9
The Olivia court rejected the plaintiff's attempt to impose liability on NBC
based on mere negligence or recklessness. Instead, the court ruled that because
NBC's broadcast enjoyed First Amendment protection, the proper test of liability
was incitement of the harmful conduct. To hold otherwise, the court believed,
would force television stations to dilute and sanitize the content of their
7. See generally Alan Stephens, Annotation, First Amendment Guarany of Freedom of Speech
or Press as Defense to Liability Stemming from Speech Allegedly Causing Bodily Injury, 94 A.L.R.
FED. 26 (1989 & Supp. 1993); see also supra note 6.
8. 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1108 (1982).
9. Id. at 891.
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broadcasts so as to "reduce the U.S. adult population to viewing only what is
fit for children."' 0 Because the plaintiff could not meet this more demanding
standard, her case was dismissed.
Olivia provides an interesting comparison because one can imagine the
same "plunger" scene appearing in a pornographic film rather than a network
broadcast. Therefore, the question that arises is whether a pornographic film
would enjoy the benefit of a similar, heightened tort liability standard.
Olivia makes clear, however, that the legal classification of the material in
which the offending scene appeared determines the standard of tort liability for
the scene itself. The Olivia court's ruling that "incitement" provided the proper
standard of liability for the scene in question flowed from its preliminary
determination that the television program constituted protected speech under the
First Amendment.'" By implication, had the same scene appeared in material
that did not enjoy First Amendment protection, the court would have applied a
lesser, more recovery-oriented standard of liability.
Indirect confirmation of this result comes from Eimann v. Soldier of
Fortune Magazine, Inc. 2 and Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc.'3
In these cases, Soldier of Fortune magazine ran private advertisements which
were "thinly veiled offers of the services of hit men."" Magazine readers
contacted the persons advertising their services and hired them to kill other
individuals. In both cases, the courts rejected the magazine's claim that the
First Amendment protected its conduct from negligence liability. The opinions
placed great emphasis on the fact that the advertisements involved commercial
speech. While recognizing that even commercial speech enjoyed First
Amendment protection, these opinions also ruled that commercial speech did not
enjoy the full panoply of constitutional protection enjoyed by "core
speech"-speech that is "integrally related to the exposition of thought."'"
These cases thus present the flip side to Olivia: where the First Amendment
does not fully protect the print or broadcast media, less stringent liability
standards will apply.
10. Id. at 892-93.
11. Id. at 892.
12. 680 F. Supp. 863 (S.D. Tex. 1988).
13. 651 F. Supp. 1397 (W.D. Ark. 1987).
14. E/mann, 680 F. Supp. at 864. The Emann advertisement read: 'EX-MARINES-'67-69
'Nam vets--ex-DI-weapons specialist. . . high risk assignments." Id. at 864. One of the Norwood
advertisements read: "GUN FOR HIRE: 37 year-old-professional mercenary desires jobs.
Vietnam Veteran. Discreet and very private." Norwood, 651 F. Supp. at 1398.
15. Emann, 680 F. Supp. at 865 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 779 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring)). See also Norwood, 651
F. Supp. at 1398-99.
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I. OBSCENrrY As UNPROTECTED SPEECH
Part II demonstrated that, not surprisingly, where the First Amendment
protects a certain class of speech, courts will generally shield its proponents
from tort liability. As Olivia shows, this protection applies even when the work
contains shockingly violent, sexual material that is virtually indistinguishable
from what might appear in a pornographic work. Conversely, the Olivia court
made clear that it would not have shielded unprotected speech, such as legal
obscenity, from liability under similar circumstances.
Olivia raises the question, however, of why non-obscene works should
receive greater protection than obscene works, even when the two contain
roughly similar depictions. Part IIH.A addresses this question by explicating the
Supreme Court's obscenity jurisprudence. Part HI.B, however, discusses some
flaws in the Court's reasoning which undermine its persuasiveness.
A. The Law of Obscenity
In Miller v. California,6 the Supreme Court made clear that it would not
protect obscenity-in particular, "hard core" sexual material"7-from state
regulation. Miller's legal definition of obscenity offers some clues as to why
this material enjoys no constitutional protection. According to the Miller
definition, obscenity is material that, taken as a whole, (1) appeals to the
prurient interest, (2) depicts or describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive
manner, and (3) lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."t
This definition points to two distinct but interrelated reasons for placing
obscenity beyond the pale of constitutional protection. The first, represented by
elements (1) and (2) of the Miller test, is that American society has exhibited a
strong historical interest in regulating sexual morality. Chief Justice Burger, for
example, reflected this view in his wholehearted endorsement of the "stem 19th
century American censorship of public distribution and display of material
relating to sex."" 9 To like effect, Justice Harlan stated bluntly that "[slince the
domain of sexual morality is preeminently a matter of state concern, this Court
should be slow to interfere with state legislation calculated to protect that
morality."' Over the past several decades, state legislatures have fought a
tug-of-war with the Court on the terrain of sexual morality, losing ground on
16. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
17. Id. at 27.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 35.
20. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476; 502 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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contraception2 ' and abortion,' but retaining it as to non-heterosexual
intercourse.' In the realm of obscenity, the Court has seen no reason to
intervene. By declaring obscenity "unprotected," the Court has given its
blessing to continued state regulation.
The second reason, represented by element (3) of the Miller test, is the
Court's belief that such material lacks sufficient value to merit constitutional
protection. Justice Brennan emphasized this point when he stated that "[a]ll
ideas having the slightest redeeming social importance . . . have the full
protection of the guaranties" of free speech and free press.' Something has
"redeeming social importance," in turn, if it forms an "essential part of any
exposition of ideas, " ' in particular ideas concerning social and political
conditions. Because literature, art, science, and political speech all involve such
an exchange of ideas, all come within First Amendment protection.' In the
Court's view, however, material that involves only appeal to the prurient interest
and has patently offensive depictions of sexual conduct does not contribute to
this exchange."
Thus, the constitutional protection offered to material such as the graphic
rape scene in Olivia very much depends on the context in which it appears.
When such graphic sexual violence appears within non-obscene material, as in
Olivia, the Court is highly concerned with avoiding the possibility of chilling
speech that may form an "essential part of any exposition of ideas." When
graphic sexual violence appears within obscene material, in contrast, the Court
has no such concern, because the chilling effect itself operates upon a class of
materials that, in the Court's view, makes no essential contribution to social and
political deliberation. Therefore, such material is properly subject to state
regulation, which may include tort liability of the kind current pornography
legislation contemplates.
B. Some Criticisms of the Law of Obscenity
The Court's twin justifications for removing obscene materials from the
21. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
22. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
23. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
24. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
25. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
26. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); see also David A. Logan, Tort Law
and the Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 51 U. Prrr. L. REV. 493, 528-34 (1990).
27. In Chief Justice Burger's words, "[T]o equate the free and robust exchange of ideas and
political debate with commercial exploitation of obscene materials demeans the grand conception of
the First Amendment and its high purposes in the historic struggle for freedom." Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973).
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scope of First Amendment protection face two long-standing criticisms. Both
objections bear on the social desirability of tort liability for pornography-caused
harms. The first criticism is that state regulation of obscenity amounts to a form
of majoritarian thought control over those who wish to engage in deviant
thought. According to this objection, the First Amendment should not permit
such majoritarian thought control, regardless of whether the underlying material
lacks "social value" or fails to contribute meaningfully to the public exchange
of ideas on moral, social, or political conditions.2'
Justice Marshall stated this view emphatically in Stanley v. Georgia,"
which struck down a Georgia statute that criminalized possession of obscene
material. To Georgia's protestation that, under the Court's previous obscenity
rulings, the defendant had no right to possess the materials in question, Marshall
responded:
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no
business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he
may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional
heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to
control men's minds.' °
Marshall did not directly challenge the Court's prior rulings themselves, but his
concern about "the power to control men's minds" voices a powerful criticism.
Tort liability for pornography-caused harms may seem a far cry from such
thought control. The fact remains, however, that substituting private tort
litigation for criminal prosecution simply represents an alternative means toward
the same end: reducing the consumption of material that the state finds
unacceptable.
The second criticism is that contrary to the Court's assertions, and
notwithstanding its other noxious qualities, obscenity does relate to the
exposition of ideas concerning social and political conditions. Hard core
pornography, for example, is no doubt lurid, offensive, sexually subordinating,
and even dull or anti-erotic; yet it is also inherently "political" in content.
Granted, pornography ordinarily does not contain, nor intend to contain, a
political statement, whether explicit or symbolic. Nonetheless, the content of
pornographic material, and its very existence, constitutes a profound challenge
28. This theme figures prominently in Justice Douglas' obscenity opinions. See, e.g., id. at
37-47 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 483-92 (1966) (Douglas,
J., dissenting); Roth, 354 U.S. at 508-14 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
29. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
30. Id. at 565.
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to the prevailing sexual and moral order. Pornography inherently rejects
conventional assessments of social value: "Pornography seeks out society's
rawest nerve, and then presses on it. The violation of social proscription is the
basis for pornography's appeal."s
Some writers have responded to this objection by asserting that hard-core
pornography contains no expressive content whatsoever. For example, Cass
Sunstein writes that "[m]any forms of pornography are not an appeal to the
exchange of ideas, political or otherwise; they operate as masturbatory aids and
do not qualify for top-tier First Amendment protection. " Similarly, Frederick
Schauer characterizes pornography as material that does not engage the human
mind, but simply produces physical stimuli, and is therefore not a form of
speech. 3
3
These responses no doubt capture much truth about hard-core pornography.
However, they do not answer the critics' objection. Even granting that
pornography mostly functions as a "masturbatory aid," pornography produces
such an effect primarily by operating on the consumer's "mind," rather than the
consumer's "body." People differ in their responses to pornography precisely
because it engages the imagination of some, but bores or offends that of others.
Thus pornography's effects cannot be purely "physical." By the same token,
even if pornography largely functions as a "masturbatory aid," this fact need not
preclude it from contributing to the exposition of ideas. Precisely because
pornography touches on matters that polite company does not discuss,
pornography has the power to stimulate thought about prevailing sexual mores,
sexual roles, and the social construction or enforcement of those mores and
roles.' This objection suggests that whatever rationale exists for shielding
NBC in Olivia from tort liability for viewer-caused conduct, may apply with
equal force to the pornography industry.
IV. SOME CONCERNS ABOUT THE CHILLING EFFECT
To summarize the argument thus far, Part II suggested that the
"unprotected" nature of obscenity supported a tort regime of a kind which courts
have rejected for "protected" material. Part ILI.A presented the doctrinal
31. Steven G. Gey, The Apologetics of Suppression: The Regulation of Pornography as Act and
Idea, 86 MICH. L. Rsv. 1564, 1628 (1988).
32. Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHi. L. REv. 795, 807-08 (1993).
33. See Frederick Schauer, Speech and 'Speech -- Obsceniry and Obscenity ': An Exercise
in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEo. L.J. 899, 923-24 (1975).
34. See, e.g., Nadine Strossen,A Feminist Critique of The Feminist C0tique of Pornography,"
79 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1130-33 (1993). Strossen argues that because pornography conveys the
message "that sexuality need not be tied to reproduction, men or domesticity," it promotes sexual
liberation of women rather than sexual subordination. Id. at 1132-33.
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arguments for excluding obscenity from First Amendment protection. However,
Part uI.B also expressed skepticism concerning the soundness of these
arguments.
Despite the criticisms voiced in Part Ill.B, the imposition of tort liability
on the pornography industry for harms caused by its viewers clearly does not
violate the First Amendment, as long as liability attaches only to legally obscene
material. This conclusion, however, does not end the inquiry. Apart from the
general concerns about state regulation of pornography raised in Part III.B, the
potentially far-reaching effects of such tort liability also raise unique concerns
about a chilling effect. Part IV.A discusses these concerns, while Part IV.B
proposes and analyzes a possible solution.
A. The Far-reaching Effects of the PVCA
The Senate committee report on the PVCA denied that it would inhibit any
constitutionally protected, socially-valuable speech. The committee reasoned:
The bill complies with all requirements of the [F]irst
[A]mendment. It is limited solely to obscenity and child pornography,
two categories that the Supreme Court has held are without [F]irst
[Almendment protection. For this reason, the chilling effect ... is
inapplicable. The chilling effect is, at most, no greater than that
created by criminal laws against the same materials, a chilling effect
that is by definition constitutional.33
The committee's belief that the PVCA would have no greater chilling effect than
existing criminal laws, however, seems dubious.
The PVCA provides victims of sexual crimes with a strong financial
incentive to identify and seek recovery against as many "pornographic"
influences on the underlying criminal conduct as possible. Consequently, as an
initial matter, a PVCA plaintiff will name as a defendant any seller, distributor,
or producer of sexually explicit material whose consumption she can reasonably
attribute to her attacker. Some of the material in question ultimately will prove
to be legally obscene, but some will not. In order to make such determinations,
however, courts must examine the allegedly offending material on a case-by-case
basis. Even when the court determines certain material to be non-obscene and,
therefore, exempts it from tort liability, its manufacturers, sellers, and
distributors may incur a substantial expense in defending their product.
35. REPORT, supra note 2, at 11.
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Moreover, defendants whose material is found legally obscene and causally
implicated in the plaintiff's injury may be required to pay a considerable money
judgment. This should strike greater fear in the pornography industry than does
the existing regulation of pornography through the criminal law.' In many
parts of the country, criminal obscenity statutes are notoriously under-enforced,
and even where enforced, may result only in small fines. More importantly,
given the interstate mobility of printed and audio-visual matter, producers,
sellers, and distributors may be subject to civil suit in jurisdictions whose
criminal laws could not reach them.
Consequently, the PVCA will chill the creative efforts of many businesses
and individuals who do not consider their products legally obscene, but who do
not wish to risk unaffordable attorney fees and ruinous judgments in order to
vindicate their position. These parties, who may have little fear of the criminal
law, cannot afford to become enmeshed in tort litigation. Their resultant self-
censorship may result in heavily diluting the message they seek to convey, to
public detriment.
B. A Proposed Solution
To avoid such over-deterrence, legislation such as the PVCA should define
more precisely and more narrowly the scope of regulable material than by the
mere use of the term "obscenity." Admittedly, the PVCA itself contains certain
procedural safeguards that result in a fairly stringent standard of liability. For
example, the PVCA applies only to material that is "obscene beyond a
reasonable doubt," 37 on the rationale that this limitation ensures that only those
persons properly subject to criminal prosecution may suffer a civil judgment.
However, the reasonable doubt standard still turns on the factfinder's discretion
as to what material is legally obscene. The PVCA's failure to draw clear lines
will leave many potential defendants guessing on which side of the line their
material falls.
Instead, the PVCA could draw on standards initially proposed by Andrea
Dworkin and Catherine MacKinnon to isolate the class of materials most likely
to incite sexual violence. For example, the PVCA might state that it applies
only to obscene material that, in addition to its obscenity, depicts men, women,
or children:
(1) as enjoying sexual pleasure in being raped;
36. "The fear of damage awards . . . may be markedly more inhibiting than the fear of
prosecutionunder a criminal statute." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964).
37. REPORT, supra note 2, at 3.
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(2) as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or
physically hurt, or as dismembered into body parts;
(3) as penetrated by objects or animals; or
(4) in scenarios of injury, torture, filth, or bleeding.'
This restriction would target the material most likely to cause sexual violence.
At the same time, it would sufficiently limit plaintiffs' causes of action so as to
prevent chilling of the borderline, but constitutionally protected material.
This restriction, however, faces a constitutional hurdle in the form of the
Supreme Court's decision in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul.39 In R.A. V., the Court
struck down a city misdemeanor ordinance that applied to persons who publicly
displayed a symbol, such as a burning cross, which they had reasonable grounds
to know would cause racially based anger or alarm. The Court recognized that
the government could regulate inflammatory speech or "fighting words" as a
class. However, the Court ruled that the government could not pick and choose
among particular kinds of fighting words so as to favor certain messages over
others, such as non-racially inflammatory fighting words over racially
inflammatory fighting words.
The restriction proposed by Dworkin and MacKinnon raises such a problem
because rather than regulating obscenity as a whole, it picks out only a sub-class
of obscenity. Nonetheless, this objection need not prove fatal. The R.A. V.
Court itself concedes that "[w]hen the basis for the content discrimination
consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is
proscribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination
exists."' In the present context, the PVCA's statutory objectives are to
provide a compensatory remedy for, and deter dissemination of, materials whose
consumption causes sexual violence. Hence the restriction in question should
provide a "neutral" rather than viewpoint-discriminatory basis of distinction:
it should operate not to discriminate against particular forms of pornography, but
to regulate the material most closely connected with the social harms attributed
to pornography.
This account should distinguish the present restriction from the Court's
concerns in R.A.V. In R.A.V., the Court apparently believed that even if
38. These elements derive from an anti-pornography statute proposed by Dworkin and
MacKinnon and adopted by the Indianapolis'City Council. See American Booksellers Ass'n v.
Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 324 (7th Cir. 1985), af'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
39. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
40. Id. at 2545.
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racially tinged symbols present distinct social problems, they pose no inherently
greater danger to the social order than do fighting words in general. Therefore,
the city of St. Paul's content-discriminatory ordinance posed the risk of masking
government intent to favor some messages over others without regard to their
comparative social harmfulness. In the present instance, however, the intimate
connection between "violent" or "degrading" pornography and sexual crime
significantly reduces the risk that the restriction merely reflects a government
predilection for non-violent, non-degrading pornography. The greater the
degree of violence or degradation the material contains, the greater its
contribution to sexual crimes, and hence the more strongly the rationale for its
regulation applies.
V. CONCLUSION
Tort liability against pornographers for the acts of their viewers poses some
conceptual problems. In particular, it makes depictions of sexual violence that
appear within obscene material actionable, even though-as Olivia, discussed in
Part II, shows-virtually the same depictions could appear in non-obscene, non-
actionable material, with equally harmful results. As discussed in Part lIH.A,
the Supreme Court has justified this difference in treatment on the grounds that
obscene material does not contribute to the exchange of ideas on social and
political conditions, and therefore it need not receive constitutional protection.
As discussed in Part LI.B, however, this position may seriously underestimate
both the social value of pornography and the social harms of its regulation.
As matters stand, however, such tort liability is plainly constitutional. The
compensatory and deterrent objectives of this regime, according to its
proponents, may have pronounced, socially beneficial effects. Restriction of the
statute's reach to material that plainly encourages sexual violence, however, can
fulfill such compensatory and deterrent objectives, while avoiding undue
censorship or inhibition of socially valuable but sexually explicit material.
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